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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LARRY R. VONWALD, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
V. No. 940731-CA 
KEVIN PLUMB, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPgUANT 
JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is 
based on a transfer from the Supreme Court of Utah 
under Utah Code Ann. 1953, Sec. 78-2a-3(2) (k) 
(1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following is included as supplementing the 
standard of appellate review part of paragraph 4. 
under the heading STATEMENT OF ISSUES as contained 
in appellant's opening brief, page 4. The question 
there presented relates to the trial court's 
failure to exercise its discretion in not 
considering or ruling upon appellant's URCivP 11 
sanctions. The failure of the trial court to 
exercise its discretion, and whether or not it 
should have, presents a legal question subject to 
review for correctness. Crossland Savings v. 
Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241 (Utah App. 1994), citing 
Garrett v. City and County of San Francisco, 818 
F.2d 1515 (9th Cir. 1987). 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY 
1. Contract terms that are clear and 
unambiguous are interpreted according to their 
plain and ordinary meaning and extrinsic or parol 
evidence is generally not admissible to explain the 
intent of the parties. Equitable Life and Cas. 
Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah App. 
1993). 
Appellee Plumb contends that the provision 
"Buyer to pay for topographic study for property 
and obtaining approval of building plans by Salt 
Lake County within 30 days of seller providing 
evidence of clear and marketable title" preceded by 
"[s]pecial considerations and contingencies. This 
offer is made subject to the following special 
conditions and/or contingencies which must be 
satisfied prior to closing:. . ." establishes that 
county approval of appellee Plumb's building plans 
is a condition precedent to closing. Appellee 
Plumb argues "[c]learly, obtaining approval of 
building plans by Salt Lake County was a condition 
2 
precedent to closing. Otherwise, it would not have 
been included in Section 7 which specifically 
listed "conditions and/or contingencies which must 
be satisfied prior to closing." [Brief of 
Appellee, p. 9] In doing so appellee Plumb fails 
to apply the plain and ordinary meaning rule. 
Thus, Section 7 is labeled or headed "special 
considerations and contingencies - this offer is 
made subject to the following special conditions 
and/or contingencies which must be satisfied prior 
to closing," but what follows after the label or 
heading, interpreted according to its plain and 
ordinary meaning, gives Plumb the discretion to 
within 30 days of seller providing evidence of 
clear and marketable title, to pay for a 
topographic study and obtain county approval and 
possesses none of the characteristics or 
terminology of the condition appellee Plumb 
ascribes to it, does not implement the same, and 
therefore the corollary legal consequences of a 
condition precedent should not follow. The nature 
of the language used by appellee Plumb controls and 
not the form of the printed label or heading. 
3 
2. Appellee Plumb asserts in his brief that 
he supported his motion for summary judgment with 
affidavits that were unopposed by appellant 
VonWald; at the same time he asserts that the 
contractual provisions at issue are unambiguous in 
providing that county approval is a condition 
precedent to closing. If the contract is 
unambiguous "extrinsic or parol evidence is 
generally not admissible to explain the intent of 
the parties." Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. 
Ross, 849 P. 2d 1187 (Utah App. 1993). Appellant 
VonWald agrees that the contract is unambiguous, 
but unambiguous and did not provide for a condition 
precedent as appellee claims. 
Some of the factual assertions made in 
appellee's brief require comment. At page 5 it is 
stated that "Plumb submitted the site plan to 
William A. Marsh [], Section Manager, Salt Lake 
County Development Services Division, for approval 
[ ]. Marsh disapproved the site plan because the 
slope of the driveway exceeded the county limits 
[]. Without an approved site plan, Plumb could not 
4 
thereafter obtain an approved building plan. []" 
Whether the site plan was submitted to the county 
is questionable; submission to the county would 
have to be in accordance with existing regulations 
and there is no indication of what is required for 
a site plan to be submitted "to the county." It 
would seem though that in this instance where Marsh 
in his disapproval] of the driveway included in 
the site plan, stated that the "[r]emainder of site 
plan must be approved prior to issuance of a 
building permit" the site plan was not submitted to 
nor "rejected by the county." [Brief of Appellee, 
p. 5] In passing, it would appear that it would be 
impossible if not impracticable, for the county to 
give appropriate consideration or take action on a 
site plan without knowing something about the 
structure the site plan is designed to accommodate. 
None of this is relevant [assuming the Court 
agrees that the contract is unambiguous] except as 
to appellee Plumb's good faith. Were the Court to 
find that Section 7 establishes the existence of 
the condition precedent [county approval of 
building plan] the inquiry does not end. Where the 
5 
performance of the contingency or condition is 
within the control of a party to the agreement, the 
party for whose benefit the condition precedent 
runs is required to use "reasonable efforts11 to 
have it occur. 
The failure to perform a condition precedent 
may be construed as a breach of contract. Hardin, 
Rodriguez & Boivin v. Paradigm Ins., 962 F.2d 628 
(7th Cir. 1992); Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
Sec. 225(3). 
The record is devoid of any facts showing that 
appellee Plumb used reasonable efforts to satisfy 
the requirements of the condition precedent he 
claims exists before he canceled the contract. 
The doctrine of good faith performance as it 
relates to the covenant of fair dealing and good 
faith imposes a limitation on the exercise of 
discretion vested in one of the parties to a 
contract. In describing the nature of that 
limitation the courts of this state have held that 
a party vested with contractual discretion must 
exercise that discretion reasonably and with proper 
motive, and may not do so arbitrarily, 
6 
capriciously, or in a manner inconsistent with the 
reasonable expectations of the parties. S t 
Benedicts Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.
 f 811 
P.2d 194 (Utah 1991); Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 
812 P.2d 49 (Utah 1991); Brown v. Weisr 871 P.2d 
552 (Utah App. 1994). 
Where county approval of building plans is 
necessary is it in the discretion of appellee Plumb 
to not make application for approval of building 
plans but do what he did here, and thereby render 
good faith performance? Appellee's own allegations 
raise an inference of bad faith. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant VonWald respectfully requests that 
the order here appealed be in all things reversed 
and the matter remanded for trial such remand be on 
the basis indicated in appellant's opening brief. 
DATED December 19, 1994. 
On December 19, 1994, two copies of the 
foregoing hand-delivered to Dennis K. Poole at 4543 
7 
South 700 East, Ste. 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111. 
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